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Abstract
The WTOs strict treatment of domestic subsidies has not been well received
in the existing literature. An essential reason is that the consequent restriction on
domestic e¢ ciency is hardly compatible with the existing theory of government in-
tervention under which the primary objective of using domestic subsidies, domestic
e¢ ciency, is not sacriced for another objective. We develop a trade-agreement
model in which the magnitude of a legitimate domestic subsidy with which to ad-
dress a production externality is private information. We nd that an optimal
agreement substantially restricts domestic e¢ ciency for the international objective
of expanding market access.
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1 Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has introduced additional discipline in the use
of domestic subsidies that was not present under the General Agreement on Tari¤s and
Trade (GATT). This strengthening of subsidy discipline is embodied in the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM agreement). Under the GATT rules,
a government had the right to make a non-violation complaint if it could show that its
trading partners new or increased domestic subsidy program nullied or impaired the
market-access benets the government had reasonably expected at the time of the tari¤
negotiation. The subsidizing government, having no obligation to remove the subsidy,
was then expected to make policy adjustments that would restore the negotiated market
access. Under the SCM agreement, however, a domestic production subsidy is actionable
regardless of whether it nullies or impairs the market-access commitment made by the
preceding tari¤ negotiation. Thus, a government that uses a domestic production subsidy
is under pressure to remove the subsidy or at least its adverse e¤ects regardless of the
extent to which the subsidy is needed for domestic e¢ ciency.1
The WTOs strict treatment of domestic subsidies raises an important question: is the
strengthening of subsidy discipline an e¢ ciency-enhancing regulatory step or has it gone
too far? In the analytical literature, the existing terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements
points out the potential harm of the strict treatment of domestic subsidies. This concern
is essentially rooted in the targeting principle (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963; Johnson,
1965) under which the governments optimal intervention targets market imperfections
directly at the margin. A central message of this principle is that a government should
be able to use a rst-best domestic policy to remedy a domestic market failure. Under
the principle, the primary objective of using domestic policies, domestic e¢ ciency, is not
sacriced for another objective. In this paper, we o¤er a theoretical justication for the
world trading system to constrain the use of domestic subsidies and allow the consequent
restriction on domestic e¢ ciency for the international objective of reducing import tari¤s
and expanding market access.
A proper treatment of domestic subsidies is di¢ cult to set, not merely because they
may be used as (i) a legitimateinstrument to address market imperfections and (ii) an
import-protection instrument to circumvent tari¤ liberalization, but also because these
two purposes are not clearly distinguished in practice. In this sense, it is not surprising
that domestic subsidies often cause international disputes. Sykes (2005, 2010) argues
1For more discussion, see Bagwell (2008), Bagwell and Staiger (2006), Bagwell, Staiger and Sykes
(2013) and Sykes (2005, 2010). For a comprehensive historical and legal background of the SCM agree-
ment, see Coppens (2014).
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that the problem with the WTOs restriction on domestic subsidies arises mainly from
the conceptual and practical di¢ culties of determining which domestic subsidies are used
as undesirable protective measures; without such di¢ culties, the restriction on domestic
subsidies might only be negotiated to target the protective use of subsidies.2 Sykes as-
serts that it is arguably impossible to develop general principles that distinguish between
permissible and impermissible subsidies.
In this paper, we consider a trade-agreement model in which governments look for a
proper balance between exibility and discipline in their cooperative policies. Flexibil-
ity is necessary for the domestic objective of responding to domestic shocks in a state-
contingent way, and discipline is necessary for the international objective of regulating
a governments incentive to misrepresent the magnitude of domestic shocks for protec-
tive purposes. Specically, we develop a simple 2-country 2-good model in which trade
occurs in home and foreign countries and their markets are perfectly competitive. The
model has two underlying assumptions. First, a domestic subsidy is a legitimate instru-
ment with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-production in the
import-competing sector. Second, a government cannot determine whether its trading
partner uses its domestic subsidy as a legitimate or protective instrument. Formally, the
model assumes that (i) the domestic production of import good by the home country
generates a positive external value within its borders and (ii) the home government has
private information about its externality type and thus about the magnitude of a legiti-
mate subsidy with which to internalize the a¤ected margin. We assume a continuum of
possible externality types in an interval such that the home government with a higher
type places a higher value on the domestic production of import good. To deliver the
main points simply, the model focuses on the home governments intervention only in its
import-competing sector while it allows for two publicly-observable policy instruments: a
domestic production subsidy and an import tari¤.
In the model, when governments write an agreement, they specify the policy set (i.e.,
the set of policy mixes) from which they can subsequently select their policy pairs. We
assume that an agreement is enforceable if and only if the specied policy set is incen-
tive compatible. A policy set is incentive compatible if the home government with one
externality type cannot gain from selecting a policy mix that is prescribed for this gov-
ernment when it has a di¤erent externality type. This incentive constraint is analogous
to the standard truth-telling constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems. We
2The non-violation complaints of GATT rules also proved di¢ cult to carry out. From 1947 to 1995 only
14 out of the more than 250 Article XXIII proceedings centered on such complaints (Petersmann, 1997).
This fact appears to reect the di¢ culties of determining the trade e¤ects of domestic policy changes.
Note, however, that the paucity of GATT/WTO rulings on non-violation claims and their limited success
may not undermine the importance of the non-violation clause, as Staiger and Sykes (2015) show.
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say that an agreement is optimal if the policy set is incentive compatible and generates at
least as high expected global welfare as any incentive-compatible policy set. We consider
the stage game: (i) two governments sign an agreement that species the policy set and
(ii) the home government observes its externality type and selects its policy mix from the
specied policy set.
The starting point of our analysis is to examine the incentive problem that is com-
monly featured at the theoretical and policy levels: subsequent to a tari¤ commitment,
the home government has incentive to raise its domestic subsidy for protective purpose.3
In particular, to highlight the consequences of the incentive problem, we consider a hypo-
thetical agreement in which the home government is granted the exibility to select any
policy mix as long as it preserves the world price at a negotiated level. The corresponding
policy set is a strictly decreasing iso-world-price function on the policy-mix space given
that the world price falls when a subsidy or tari¤ rises. This agreement promotes domestic
e¢ ciency because the home government under the policy set selects Pigouvian subsidies
and internalizes the a¤ected margin in a state-contingent way. On the other hand, the
agreement allows high import tari¤s and thus reduces the foreign countrys market ac-
cess. Intuitively, allowing high tari¤s plays the role of providing the home government
with information rentsfor domestic e¢ ciency to be incentive compatible: given a state-
contingent subsidy interval, if the government were not allowed to raise tari¤s, then it
would overstate its type and raise the subsidy above the Pigouvian level, because by do-
ing so it could lower the world price and bring a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to the home
(foreign) country.4 In other words, although domestic e¢ ciency is undoubtedly a vital
consideration for a proper treatment of domestic subsidies, it is costly to achieve because a
state-contingent use of Pigouvian subsidies accompanies high import tari¤s. We formalize
this argument and show that the agreements that use Pigouvian subsidies in all states are
3Empirical research reports that tari¤ commitments motivate governments to use domestic policies as
a means of import protection (see Ederington (2010) for a related survey). Broda, Limao and Weinstein
(2008) show that the United States, subsequent to tari¤ commitments, set signicantly higher non-tari¤
barriers in import-competing sectors where it has greater ability to a¤ect foreign exporter prices and
manipulate the foreign countrys terms of trade. Ederington and Minier (2003) argue that political-
economy concerns may cause governments to relax environmental regulations on industries that face
import surges, showing that an increase in imports is correlated with a subsequent reduction in pollution
abatement expenditures across U.S. manufacturing industries.
4On the actual policy level, terms of trade are not featured as much as the market-access level implied
by trade policy. As Bagwell (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) show, however, the market-
access loss that foreign exporters experience when the home government raises its tari¤ (or subsidy) is
simply the quantity e¤ectthat accompanies the price e¤ectof a deterioration in the foreign countrys
terms-of-trade. The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements shows that GATT/WTO is well designed
to minimize the terms-of-trade e¤ect on the policy choices of member governments. The relevance of the
terms-of-trade theory is supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 2011, Broda, Limao
and Weinstein, 2008 and Ludema and Mayda, 2013).
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suboptimal. The use of fully Pigouvian subsidies that remedies under-production distor-
tions at the margin in all states actually results in the home government becoming overly
protective due to the accompanying high tari¤s and additional domestic production.
We next associate an agreement that keeps a market-access preservation rule with an
agreement in which the home government is granted the exibility to select policies as
long as it preserves the world price at a constant level. We establish the suboptimality
of keeping a market-access preservation rule: there always exists a superior agreement
that restricts domestic e¢ ciency further and expands market access beyond the level
achieved by an agreement that keeps a market-access preservation rule. We nd that
an optimal agreement restricts domestic e¢ ciency extensively over the entire interval
of states. The restriction on domestic e¢ ciency is presented in two respects. First, an
optimal agreement restricts domestic e¢ ciency at the top (i.e., for the subinterval of types
adjoining the highest type). Intuitively, a rigid (state-independent) use of subsidies at the
top makes it possible to satisfy the truth-telling incentive with zero tari¤s at the top and
reduced tari¤s for lower types, because even under reduced tari¤s, the government cannot
raise subsidies above the rigid level. Second, an agreement is suboptimal if it includes
an iso-world-price function as its policy subset and entails the use of Pigouvian subsidies
in a subinterval of types. This policy subset can always be shifted to reduce tari¤s and
raise the world price by allowing a new rigidity at the top. We nd that such a shift of
the original policy subset improves the international welfare due to the state-dependent
substitutability between two policy instruments: for the same rigid policy mix (the same
domestic production) at the top, the home government with a lower type is willing to
accept a lower tari¤ and o¤er greater market access.
The WTOs strict treatment of domestic subsidies has not been well received in the
existing literature.5 An essential reason for this is that the consequent restriction on
domestic e¢ ciency is hardly compatible with the targeting principle. The existing terms-
of-trade theory of trade agreements provides an e¢ ciency rationale for trade agreements
to adopt a shallow integration: international e¢ ciency can be achieved by tari¤ negotia-
tions alone under the non-violation complaints that secure market access against potential
erosion from subsequent behind-the-border measures. With regard to the treatment of
domestic subsidies, the existing terms-of-trade theory supports the GATT-type market-
access preservation rule. Under the rule, the home government has the exibility to select
its domestic policies up to the point where its policies start eroding the market-access
commitments achieved by the preceding tari¤ negotiations, and the government can then
position its domestic subsidy to an e¢ cient level. Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006) show
5The potential harm of the WTOs restriction on subsidies has been broadly raised by Bagwell and
Staiger (2006), Mavroidis, Messerlin and Wauters (2008), Rodrik (2011) and Stiglitz (2006).
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that the exibility implied by the market-access preservation rule plays a central role for
international e¢ ciency to be achieved through tari¤ negotiations alone. In Bagwell and
Staiger (2001), an e¢ cient policy mix is achieved when the home government is granted
the exibility to readjust its tari¤s unilaterally to secure market access at the negotiated
level.6 In Bagwell and Staiger (2006), the redundancy of policy instrument ensures that
the home government, bound by the tari¤ commitment, has the exibility to reposition its
domestic policies while keeping domestic e¢ ciency and causing no disruption to the for-
eign countrys market access. Ederington (2001) develops a self-enforcing agreement and
shows that the value of cooperation is maximized when the agreement allows a protective
measure only in the form of import tari¤s while keeping domestic policies undistorted.
Lee (2007) adopts an incomplete-information model and shows that an optimal agreement
may allow governments to raise tari¤s to prevent domestic policies from being distorted
to disguise protectionism.7
In contrast, a key policy implication of our nding contained in the suboptimality of
keeping a market-access preservation rule is that an optimal agreement allows no such
exibility or discretion over subsidies implied by the GATT rules and that the WTOs
restriction on domestic subsidies may be a necessary regulatory step to expand market
access beyond the level achieved under the GATT rules.8 In addition, our model conrms
that an optimal agreement adopts a deep integration: an optimal agreement goes beyond
tari¤negotiations and includes constraints on the use of domestic subsidies. In our model,
with no constraint on tari¤s, the government could use the best instrument to capture the
terms-of-trade gain, the tari¤, and lower the world price too much. Given that tari¤s are
necessarily bound, with no constraint on domestic subsidies, domestic distortions would
be prevalent because the government could then use an inferior instrument to capture
the terms-of-trade gain, the domestic subsidy. Importantly, our model adopts a fairly
6Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002) propose a modication to GATT rules of renegotiation that
would provide a government with the exibility to raise its tari¤s unilaterally to secure market access at
the negotiated level when it tightens the domestic standard that would grant greater market access.
7Amador and Bagwell (2013), Bagwell (2009), Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Beshkar (2010), Beshkar
and Bond (2015), Bajona and Ederington (2012), Feenstra and Lewis (1991), Martin and Vergote (2008)
and Park (2011) develop theoretical models of trade agreements among governments with private in-
formation. None of these papers assume our current setting: privately-informed governments cooperate
over two policy instruments when two instruments are observable and the substitutability between two
instruments is imperfect and state-dependent. Lee (2007) studies a self-enforcing agreement in which
countries have private information, restricting attention to the two-type setting and linear functions. In
association with our current nding, Lee (2007) includes a brief conjecture (with no formal analysis) that
a continuous-type model may pose various possibilities of allowing domestic distortions.
8On the other hand, our model reports that an optimal agreement still allows state-contingent subsidies
with positive tari¤s though it allows no Pigouvian subsidies in a subinterval of states. This observation
indicates that while it takes a necessary regulatory measure, the SCM agreement may be perceived as an
overly restrictive regulation.
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standard terms-of-trade approach in that international externality travels only through
the terms of trade and equilibrium prices are determined by market-clearing conditions.
Our nding thus implies that the existing terms-of-trade theorys support for shallow
integration may be weakened when a terms-of-trade model has an additional source of
ine¢ ciency, private information, that requires the use of domestic subsidies to be incentive
compatible.
There is a small but growing literature that provides a rationale for the WTOs restric-
tion on subsidies and for the recent preferential trade agreements that include behind-the-
border measures in their commitments. Bajona and Ederington (2012) use a self-enforcing
agreement and nd their rationale from a di¤erent source of private information: if domes-
tic policies are privately observed and thus may be used without triggering punishment,
then restrictions on domestic e¢ ciency may increase the enforceability of a trade agree-
ment. Sauré (2014) considers a self-enforcing agreement with persistent economic condi-
tions in which a country, by changing its policy mix while keeping the negotiated terms
of trade, can a¤ect its future production possibilities and manipulate its own defection
incentives. Sauré shows that the self-enforceable set of policies is larger in a policy-mix
agreement than in a terms-of-trade commitment. DeRemer (2013) examines the export
sector to show that the WTOs prohibition of export subsidies and export-promoting
domestic subsidies may be welfare-improving when the home governments incentive to
shift prots from foreign to domestic rms acts as a cross-border externality that leads to
ine¢ ciencies. Brou and Ruta (2013) justify the restriction on domestic subsidies in light
of the commitment theory: as a commitment device that eliminates possible inuences
from ex post domestic lobbying, a government signs a trade agreement that constrains
both tari¤s and domestic subsidies, since under a tari¤ commitment alone, the lobby can
still inuence the choice of domestic subsidies. Antràs and Staiger (2012) o¤er o¤shoring
as a rationale for trade agreements to take a deep-integration approach: for the terms-of-
trade manipulation, governments distort behind-the-border measures other than the tari¤
in the presence of o¤shoring where international prices are determined by bilateral bar-
gaining between domestic importers and foreign exporters rather than by market-clearing
conditions.
Our ndings are based on a standard terms-of-trade model that has no issues related
to enforcement, commitment or o¤shoring. The restriction on domestic e¢ ciency present
in our model may be referred to as an incomplete-information interpretation of the con-
tractual rigidity found in Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010). Regarding the WTO/GATT as
a highly incomplete contract, Horn, Maggi and Staiger suggest that an increase in trade
volume heightens the need to constrain the use of domestic subsidies because it increases
the incentive to distort subsidies for the terms-of-trade gain. In our model, domestic
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e¢ ciency takes informational costs in the form of import tari¤s to satisfy incentive
compatibility, and the restriction on domestic e¢ ciency reduces informational costs. In
Horn, Maggi and Staiger, the contractual rigidity saves on the costs of contracting over
policies under uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic trade model and
highlights the central incentive problem and its consequences. In Section 3, we identify
features of an optimal agreement: an optimal agreement imposes bounds on positive tari¤s
and restricts domestic e¢ ciency extensively, and it adopts a deep integration. Section 4
concludes. In the Appendix, we provide proofs.
2 Trade Model with Private Information
The model contains two key ingredients. First, a domestic subsidy is a legitimate instru-
ment with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-production in the
import-competing sector. Second, a government cannot determine whether its trading
partner uses its domestic subsidy as a legitimate or protective instrument.
2.1 The Basic Model
We consider a 2-country 2-good model in which trade occurs in two countries, home and
foreign, where markets are perfectly competitive. The home country exports one good
to the foreign country in exchange for imports of the other good. We proceed with the
good in the import (export) sector of the home (foreign) country. For this good, the
home country has a downward-sloping demand function D(pd) for the local consumer
price pd and an upward-sloping supply function Q(ps) for the local producer price ps. For
the same good, the foreign country has the corresponding demand and supply functions,
D(pd) and Q(ps), where asterisks denote foreign variables. All functions are positive
and twice-continuously di¤erentiable.
The model has two assumptions to contain the key ingredients stated above. First,
the domestic production of import good by the home country generates a non-negative
external value within its borders. Second, the home government has private information
about its externality type and thus about the magnitude of a legitimate subsidy with which
to internalize the a¤ected margin. In particular, we consider an incomplete-information
model in which the external value generated by the domestic production Q is represented
by a non-negative function v(Q). We assume that the function v is strictly increasing
and concave, v0(Q) > 0 and v00(Q) < 0, or linear, v(Q; ) = Q. Our analysis focuses on
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the strictly concave function.9 The level of  is private information and is drawn from
the support [0; ] according to the di¤erentiable distribution function F (). The density,
f()  F 0(), is positive everywhere.
To deliver our main points simply, we impose a strong symmetry restriction on the
model: import-competing sectors in two countries and policy interventions of two gov-
ernments are mirror images of each other, so that we can focus on policy intervention
by the home government only in its import-competing sectors. We allow for two policy
instruments, a domestic production subsidy s and an import tari¤  , assuming that they
are publicly observable, non-prohibitive and expressed in specic terms. In the absence
of the foreign governments intervention, the foreign producer and consumer prices are
equal, ps = pd, and may be called the world price pw. The markets in two countries
are integrated, and so a foreign producer receives the same price for sales in the foreign
country that it receives for sales in the home country after paying the tari¤  : pw = pd  .
The wedge between the home producer price and the home consumer price is the domestic
subsidy s: ps = pd + s. These pricing equations may be rewritten in useful forms:
pd = pw +  and ps = pw +  + s: (1)
Plugging these prices into the market-clearing condition,
D(pd) Q(ps) = Q(pw) D(pw), (2)
we can nd the equilibrium world price bpw(s; ) and other equilibrium prices, bpd(s; ) =bpw(s; ) +  and bps(s; ) = bpw(s; ) +  + s. It is immediate from (2) that an increase in
s or  by the home government lowers the world price of the foreign export good,
@bpw
@s
=
Q0
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) < 0 and (3)
@bpw
@
=   D
0  Q0
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) < 0. (4)
Using bps = bpw++s, we also nd that an increase in s or  raises the domestic production
9We use the linear function only for a numerical example. We have conrmed that our analyses
presented below generally hold when the external value is represented by a linear function, v(Q; ) = Q,
or by a generalized function v(Q; ) that satises v(Q; 0) = 0, v1 > 0, v11 < 0 and v12 > 0.
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of import good,
@Q
@s
= Q0
@bps
@s
=
Q0(D0   (Q0  D0))
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) > 0 and (5)
@Q
@
= Q0
@bps
@
=   Q
0(Q0  D0)
D0  Q0   (Q0  D0) > 0: (6)
Thus, tari¤ is more e¤ective than subsidy to lower the world price, @bpw
@
< @bpw
@s
< 0, and
subsidy is more e¤ective than tari¤ to increase domestic production, @Q
@s
> @Q
@
> 0.
We assume that the welfare function of each country is separable across import and
export sectors. We can thus focus on the welfare function in the home import sector which
is the foreign export sector. The home welfare for externality type  consists of consumer
surplus, prots, net revenue (revenue from the import tari¤  minus expenditures on the
production subsidy s) and the external value of domestic production:
W (s;  ; )  CS(bpd) + (bps) +  M(s; )  s Q(bps) + v(Q(bps)); (7)
where M(s; )  D(bpd)   Q(bps). Consumers and producers in the home country enjoy
the surplus: CS(bpd)  R pbpd D(p)dp and (bps)  R bpsp Q(p)dp, where p = supfp : D(p) > 0g
and p = inffp : Q(p) > 0g. The home governments policy mix (s; ) a¤ects the foreign
welfare through the world price:
W (s; )  CS(bpw) + (bpw): (8)
The home government cares about a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign
welfare, if it selects the policy mix (s; ) that maximizes the global welfare:
WG(s;  ; )  W (s;  ; ) +W (s; ): (9)
To simplify our analysis, we assume that W (s;  ; ) and W (s; ) are strictly concave on
(s; ). This assumption is satised for a large family of demand and supply functions,
including linear functions, and it also implies that WG(s;  ; ) is strictly concave.
The model contains standard features that are commonly observed in terms-of-trade
models with two policy instruments. Observe rst that an international externality travels
through the world price. If the foreign countrys terms of trade deteriorates (i.e., the world
price decreases), then the home welfare increases while the foreign welfare decreases.
Rewriting the home welfare (7) as functions of equilibrium prices,
W (bpw; bpd; bps) = CS(bpd) + (bps) + (bpd   bpw)[D(bpd) Q(bps)]  (bps   bpd)Q(bps) + v(Q(bps));
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and using the foreign welfare (8), we have
@W
@bpw =  [D(bpd) Q(bps)] < 0 and @W @bpw = [Q(bpw) D(bpw)] > 0:
Thus, an increase in s or  by the home government can lower the world price and bring
a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to the home (foreign) country. Observe next that, as the
market-clearing condition, M(s; ) = Q(bpw)   D(bpw), implies, the equilibrium trade
volume is constant (increases) when the world price is constant (increases). From (3) and
(4), it follows that an iso-world-price function may be represented by a strictly decreasing
function on the policy-mix space with the slope:
d
ds

dbpw=0 =  
@bpw=@s
@bpw=@ = Q0D0  Q0 < 0: (10)
Since we have
@M
@s
= (Q0  D0)@bpw
@s
and
@M
@
= (Q0  D0)@bpw
@
;
an iso-trade-volume function may also be represented by a strictly decreasing function
with the slope:
d
ds

dM=0
=  @M=@s
@M=@
=
Q0
D0  Q0 < 0:
If an iso-world-price function shifts down (up), then the world price and the trade volume
increase (decrease).
2.2 First-Best and Nash Policies
The home government faces a nite choice set, fs j s : [0; ] ! R+g  f j  : [0; ] !
R+g, and selects a policy mix conditional on its externality type. A typical policy mix
selected by externality type  may be denoted by (s(); ()). The expected home welfare
and expected global welfare may then be represented by
R 
0
W (s(); (); )dF () andR 
0
WG(s(); (); )dF (), respectively.
We now characterize the rst-best policy mix that maximizes the global welfareWG(s;  ; )
and the Nash (non-cooperative) policy mix that maximizes the home welfare W (s;  ; ).
Lemma 1 For all , the rst-best policy mix satises
s = v0(Q(s; 0)) and  = 0; (11)
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and the Nash policy mix satises
s = v0(Q(s; )) and  =
E(bpw)
E0(bpw) ; (12)
where E(bpw)  Q(bpw) D(bpw):
The proof of this standard result is in the Appendix. Lemma 1 shows that, either in
the e¢ cient or Nash policies, the home government with each  selects its policy mix from
the Pigouvian-subsidy set f(s; ) : s = v0(Q(s; ))g that internalizes the externality at
the margin. For  = 0, the Pigouvian-subsidy set is the vertical line, s = 0. For  > 0,
the set is a strictly decreasing function with the slope,
d
ds
=
1  v00(Q(s; ))@Q
@s
v00(Q(s; ))@Q
@
< 0; (13)
and an increase in  shifts the function to the right. Note that the slope of this function
is steeper than the slope of the iso-world-price function,1  v00(Q(s; ))@Q@sv00(Q(s; ))@Q
@
 > 1 >
 Q0D0  Q0
 ; (14)
where @Q
@s
> @Q
@
> 0 as indicated by (5) and (6). Suppose that the home governments
policy choice, departing from the rst-best policy mix, moves closer to the Nash policy
mix along the Pigouvian-subsidy set. Then the iso-world-price function that crosses the
governments policy choice shifts up, and thus the world price and the import volume
decrease. Further, the following lemma reports that the global welfare WG(s;  ; ) also
monotonically decreases as the home governments policy choice moves away from the
rst-best policy mix along the Pigouvian-subsidy set.
Lemma 2 If the policy choice of the home government with type  moves closer to the
Nash policy mix along the Pigouvian-subsidy set f(s; ) : s = v0(Q(s; ))g, then the world
price, the import volume and the global welfare WG(s;  ; ) strictly decrease.
2.3 Objective of an Agreement
We consider the stage game: (i) two governments write an agreement that species a
set of policy mixes (i.e., makes a policy-set commitment) and (ii) the home government
observes its externality type and selects its policy mix from the policy set. This stage
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game indicates that, when signing an agreement, governments specify the policy set from
which they can subsequently select their policy pairs.10
We assume that an agreement is enforceable if and only if the specied policy set is in-
centive compatible. All agreements considered in this paper have incentive-compatible pol-
icy sets because signing an agreement is equivalent to writing an incentive-compatible pol-
icy set under the assumption. A policy set is incentive compatible if the home government
with one externality type cannot gain from selecting a policy mix that is prescribed for
this government when it has a di¤erent externality type. Formally, let (s(); ()) repre-
sent the policy mix selected by type  under a policy set f(s; ) 2 R2+g, and let (es();e())
denote the policy mix selected by type  under an alternative policy set f(es;e) 2 R2+g.
We say that an agreement is optimal if the associated policy set f(s; ) 2 R2+g is incentive
compatible,
W (s(); (); )  W (s(b); (b); ) for all  and b 6= , (IC-f(s; ) 2 R2+g)
and the policy set generates at least as high expected global welfare as any other incentive-
compatible policy set f(es;e) 2 R2+g,Z 
0
WG(s(); (); )dF () 
Z 
0
WG(es();e(); )dF (); (15)
where
W (es();e(); )  W (es(b);e(b); ) for all  and b 6= : (IC-f(es;e) 2 R2+g)
Equivalently, we say that an agreement is suboptimal or not optimal if there always exists
an alternative policy set that is incentive compatible and generates a higher expected
global welfare than does the original policy set.11 Thus, the objective of an agreement is
to specify the policy set that is incentive compatible and maximizes the expected global
welfare.
10In relation to a self-enforcing agreement in a dynamic setting, this kind of agreement can be achieved
by a stationaryequilibrium in which the home government in each period selects its policy mix from
the initial policy set specied by the agreement.
11The Nash policy mix is incentive compatible: under the Nash policies, the home government with ,
having no incentive to mimic other types, selects the policy mix in (12). Notice that the participation
constraint is skipped since it is directly ensured by the optimality condition (15) under the symmetry
restriction of our model: given that the home import sector and the foreign import sector are mirror
images of each other, if the condition (15) holds, then the expected home welfare, with inclusion of the
foreign import sector, becomes
R 
0
[W (s(); (); ) +W (s(); ())]dF () and is at least as high as the
expected home welfare under the Nash policies.
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2.4 Incentive Problem
The starting point of our analysis is to examine the incentive problem that is commonly
featured at the theoretical and policy levels: subsequent to a tari¤ commitment, the home
government has incentive to raise its domestic subsidy for protective purpose. In partic-
ular, to highlight the consequences of this incentive problem, we consider a hypothetical
agreement in which the policy set keeps the world price at the constant level bpw(s; 0),
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0)g; (16)
where the endpoint (s; 0) denotes the rst-best policy mix for the highest type :
s = v0(Q(s; 0)) and  = 0: (17)
We now make an assumption so that our analysis can henceforth narrow its main at-
tention down to the region in which (i) there exists some  for which the home government
has incentive to manipulate the world price and capture the terms-of-trade gain, and (ii)
the global welfare WG(s(); (); ) is at least as high as in the Nash policies.
Assumption 1 There is no Nash policy mix in the region f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) > bpw(s; 0)g.
This assumption holds for a large family of demand and supply functions, if  is below a
certain level and the term E
(bpw)
E0(bpw) in (12) is su¢ ciently large. Therefore, all ndings that
we present hereafter are based on the circumstance under which countries are large and
have a signicant incentive to manipulate the terms of trade.
Under the hypothetical agreement above, the home government with type  maxi-
mizes W (s;  ; ) subject to the policy set (16) that is a downward-sloping iso-world-price
function. As we formally show in the Appendix, having the exibility to select any policy
mix that preserves the world price at bpw(s; 0) and thus keeps the foreign welfare at a con-
stant level, the home government internalizes the production externality at the margin
in a state-contingent way. Figure 1 illustrates the Pigouvian-subsidy choice made by the
home government with type  on an iso-world-price function when demand and supply
functions are linear.
Lemma 3 Under the policy set (16), the home government with type  selects the Pigou-
vian subsidy:
s = v0(Q(s; )): (18)
The best response of the home government with type  on the iso-world-price function
(16) is to select the Pigouvian subsidy and internalize the a¤ected margin: an iso-welfare
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Figure 1: Pigouvian-subsidy choice on an iso-world-price function.
function of the home government, W (s;  ; ) =  for a constant , is tangent to the
iso-world-price function (16) at the crossing point of two decreasing functions (16) and
(18). If  = 0, then the home government selects the Pigouvian subsidy s = 0 and
the tari¤  that satises the constraint bpw(0; ) = bpw(s; 0). If  rises, then the function
s = v0(Q(s; )) shifts to the right and the government selects Pigouvian subsidies along
the iso-world-price function (16). The highest type  selects its rst-best policy mix (s; 0).
To understand how an increase in  a¤ects the governments choice, it is useful to
observe that the iso-welfare function, W (s;  ; ) = , has the single-crossing property
(SCP): for the policy-mix region below the Nash policies, if 2 > 1, then the iso-welfare
function for 2 crosses the iso-welfare function for 1 from above only once. The SCP
states that the substitutability between two policy instruments is state-dependent due
to the two ingredients of the model: (i) the government with higher , placing a higher
value on domestic production, is more willing to increase domestic production and (ii)
subsidy is more e¤ective than tari¤ to increase domestic production, @Q
@s
> @Q
@
> 0.
Now, we pick a point (bs;b) from the policy set (16) and select the type b that satisesbs = bv0(Q(bs;b)). We can then show that, even for a marginal increase in , the slope
of the iso-welfare function W (s;  ; ) = W (bs;b ; ), d
ds
=   @W (s; ;)=@s
@W (s; ;)=@
, becomes strictly
steeper at the choice of the government with b, (bs;b), where the iso-welfare function is
tangent to the iso-world-price function (16):12
@
@
d
ds

=b =  
v0(Q(bs;b))@Q(bs;b)
@s
@W (bs;b ;b)
@
  v0(Q(bs;b))@Q(bs;b)
@
@W (bs;b ;b)
@s
[@W (bs;b ;b)=@ ]2 < 0: (19)
12The inequality in (19) follows by observing that the iso-welfare function W (s;  ; ) = W (bs;b ; )
satises @W (bs;b ;b)@ > @W (bs;b ;b)@s > 0 at the point (bs;b) where the iso-welfare function is tangent to the iso-
world-price function that has the slope
d
ds
 =  Q0D0 Q0  < 1. At a more general level, we can also show that
the SCP holds in the policy-mix region below the Nash policies, by measuring how the gradient vector of
the home welfare function, (@W (s; ;)@s ;
@W (s; ;)
@ ), changes with , (v
0(Q(s; ))@Q(s;)@s ; v
0(Q(s; ))@Q(s;)@ ),
where v0(Q(s; ))@Q(s;)@s > v
0(Q(s; ))@Q(s;)@ > 0.
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An increase in  thus generates a robust force of increasing subsidy along the set (16).
We can build on Lemma 2 and 3 and develop two general points from a global-welfare
perspective. First, among the policy sets that entail the use of fully Pigouvian subsidies,
s = v0(Q(s; )) for all , the policy set in which the world price is higher is superior to
the policy set in which the world price is lower. This nding is immediate since the global
welfare WG(s;  ; ) monotonically decreases for all  as the iso-world-price function shifts
up (and so the world price falls) along the Pigouvian-subsidy set f(s; ) : s = v0(Q(s; ))g.
Second, among the policy sets that entail the use of fully Pigouvian subsidies, the policy
set (16) is optimal. We obtain this nding by observing that the policy sets that entail
the use of fully Pigouvian subsidies must be an iso-world-price function in the region
f(s; ) : bpw(s; )  bpw(s; 0)g and that the policy set (16) entails the highest world price
among the iso-world-price functions in that region.13
The second point leads to an important insight: if an agreement chooses to internalize
the a¤ected margin in a state-contingent way, then it must allow high import tari¤s and
reduce the foreign countrys market access. Intuitively, allowing high tari¤s plays the role
of providing the home government with information rents for domestic e¢ ciency to be
incentive compatible: given a state-contingent subsidy interval, if the government were
not allowed to raise tari¤s, then it would overstate its type and raise the subsidy above
the Pigouvian level. In other words, although domestic e¢ ciency is undoubtedly a vital
consideration for a proper treatment of domestic subsidies, it is costly to achieve because
a state-contingent use of Pigouvian subsidies accompanies high import tari¤s.14 The
following lemma formalizes this argument and conrms that the use of fully Pigouvian
subsidies is too costly from a global-welfare perspective.
Lemma 4 The agreements that entail the use of Pigouvian subsidies for all  are subop-
timal.
This lemma is established by two ndings: (i) among the policy sets that entail the
use of fully Pigouvian subsidies, the policy set (16) is optimal and (ii) this policy set is
inferior to an alternative policy set that reduces tari¤s and keeps the world price above
13A policy set that entails the use of fully Pigouvian subsidies must satisfy two conditions: (i) it
must be an iso-world-price function, since a policy set that has a steeper or atter slope than an iso-
world-price function causes non-Pigouvian subsidies for some  and (ii) it must be in the region f(s; ) :bpw(s; )  bpw(s; 0)g, since an iso-world-price function in the other region f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) > bpw(s; 0)g
causes non-Pigouvian subsidies for some .
14By contrast, a rigid (state-independent) use of subsidies, although it restricts domestic e¢ ciency,
makes it possible to satisfy truth-telling incentive with lower tari¤s. For example, we can show that the
best fully rigid policy mix (bs;b) that maximizes the expected global welfare EWG(bs;b ; ) achieves a
zero-tari¤ policy mix (bs; 0), where bs = E[]v0(Q(bs; 0)).
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bpw(s; 0). As part (i) was shown above, it su¢ ces to show that the policy set (16) is inferior
to an alternative policy set that preserves the world price at a higher level,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc; 0) for sc 2 (0; s)g; (20)
where bpw(sc; 0) > bpw(s; 0). Given sc 2 (0; s), there exists c 2 (0; ) for which the policy
mix (sc; 0) is the rst-best, sc = cv0(Q(sc; 0)). Thus, under the policy set (20), the home
government with  < c internalizes the a¤ected margin with Pigouvian subsidies now
with lower tari¤s, and the government with  2 [c; ] pools at the same policy mix (sc; 0).
As we show in the Appendix, a decrease in c generates the global-welfare gain for  < c
associated with the reduced tari¤s and the global-welfare loss for  2 (c; ] associated
with the new pooling at (sc; 0). If c decreases slightly from , the marginal global-welfare
loss for  2 (c; ] approaches zero because the pooling point (sc; 0) is su¢ ciently close to
the rst-best policy mix for  2 (c; ], but the marginal global-welfare gain for  < c
remains strictly positive. Hence, the agreements that use Pigouvian subsidies for all
 are suboptimal. The use of fully Pigouvian subsidies that remedies under-production
distortions at the margin for all  actually results in the home government becoming overly
protective due to the accompanying high tari¤s and additional domestic production.
3 Optimal Agreement
In this section, we associate an agreement that keeps a market-access preservation rule
with an agreement in which the home government is granted the exibility to select
policies as long as it preserves the world price at a constant level. We then establish
the suboptimality of keeping a market-access preservation rule. For this nding, we rst
obtain the monotonicity of subsidy and the world price and then proceed to show that
an optimal agreement imposes bounds on positive tari¤s and restricts domestic e¢ ciency
extensively over the entire interval [0; ]. The ndings established in this section are quite
general in that they hold with no additional restriction on the distribution function F .
3.1 Monotonicity
In this subsection, we establish two monotonicity results. We rst focus on the policy-mix
region below the Nash policies and show that subsidy choice is weakly increasing in : if
2 > 1, then s(2)  s(1). By adding both sides of incentive-compatibility constraints
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for 1 and 2,
W (s(1); (1); 1)  W (s(2); (2); 1) and
W (s(2); (2); 2)  W (s(1); (1); 2);
we nd that these two inequalities imply
[2   1][v(Q(s(2); (2)))  v(Q(s(1); (1)))]  0:
Incentive compatibility thus implies the monotonicity of domestic production: if 2 > 1,
thenQ(s(2); (2))  Q(s(1); (1)). As we show in the Appendix, we can then establish
the monotonicity of subsidy by using the state-dependent substitutability between two
policy instruments stated by the SCP above: the government with higher , placing
a higher value on domestic production, is more willing to raise its subsidy to increase
domestic production more e¤ectively.
Whereas the monotonicity of subsidy is rather immediate from the SCP, the monotonic-
ity of the world price is nontrivial and imposed by optimality: in any optimal agreement,
if 2 > 1, then bpw(s(2); (2))  bpw(s(1); (1)), where s(2)  s(1) by the monotonic-
ity of subsidy. As we expound in the Appendix, an agreement in which the world price
is strictly increasing in  can always improve the original policy set by including an iso-
world-price function at the bottom (i.e., for the subinterval of  adjoining the lowest type
0). For example, if an agreement allows bpw(s(2); (2)) > bpw(s(1); (1)) for any 2 > 1,
then an alternative agreement can increase the global welfare for  2 [0; 2] by including
an iso-world-price function as its policy subset that promotes domestic e¢ ciency at the
higher world price bpw(s(2); (2)) in place of the original policy subset for s  s(2). The
alternative agreement increases the expected global welfare because it promotes domestic
e¢ ciency at the bottom without causing the foreign countrys terms-of-trade deteriora-
tion. We now report two monotonicity results:
Proposition 1 (i) In the policy-mix region below the Nash policies, incentive compati-
bility implies that subsidy is weakly increasing in . (ii) In any optimal agreement, the
world price is weakly decreasing in .
3.2 Bounds on Tari¤s
In this subsection, we extend the argument used in Lemma 4 and show that an optimal
agreement imposes bounds on positive tari¤s to the extent that domestic e¢ ciency is
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restricted in some states.15
We begin by characterizing the policy mix for the lowest type 0: an optimal agreement
allows a positive tari¤, (0) > 0, and uses the Pigouvian subsidy, s(0) = 0, while it requires
the highest world price to be above bpw(s; 0), bpw(s(0); (0)) > bpw(s; 0). This requirementbpw(s(0); (0)) > bpw(s; 0) is immediate from previous results: (i) if an optimal agreement
allows bpw(s(0); (0))  bpw(s; 0), then the monotonicity result implies bpw(s(); ()) bpw(s; 0) for all  2 [0; ], and (ii) among the policy sets that have bpw(s(); ())  bpw(s; 0)
for all  2 [0; ], the policy set (16) is optimal. Lemma 4 shows, however, that the
policy set (16) violates the optimality assumption. Next, an optimal agreement uses the
Pigouvian subsidy for the lowest type 0. Given bpw(s(0); (0)) > bpw(s; 0), if an agreement
has s(0) > 0, then its policy set can be extended by including an iso-world-price function
up to the point (s(0); (0)),
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s(0); (0)) for s  s(0)g:
Since bpw(s(0); (0)) is the highest world price, the policy-set extension for s  s(0) im-
proves domestic e¢ ciency at the bottom without causing the foreign countrys terms-of-
trade deterioration. Finally, an optimal agreement has (0) > 0. Given s(0) = 0, if
(0) = 0, then the agreement has the policy mix (0; 0). The agreement that contains
(0; 0) has a weakness: satisfying incentive compatibility of the lowest type 0, the agree-
ment leaves out policy mixes in the region f(s; ) : W (s;  ; 0) > W (0; 0; 0)g, but as we
show in the Appendix, an alternative agreement can increase the expected global welfare
by including an iso-world-price function as its policy subset in that region and promoting
domestic e¢ ciency at the bottom.
Lemma 5 For the lowest type 0, an optimal agreement uses the Pigouvian subsidy and a
positive tari¤, s(0) = 0 and (0) > 0, and it requires bpw(s(0); (0)) > bpw(s; 0).
We next show that the requirement for positive tari¤s to keep the world price abovebpw(s; 0) extends for all  < : in an optimal agreement, for all  < , if () > 0, thenbpw(s(); ()) > bpw(s; 0). Suppose that an optimal agreement requires bpw(s(0); (0)) >bpw(s; 0) as in Lemma 5, but it allows (b) > 0 and bpw(s(b); (b))  bpw(s; 0) for some
15Lemma 4 shows that it is too costly to promote domestic e¢ ciency from a global-welfare perspective:
the policy set f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0)g is optimal among the policy sets that entail the use of fully
Pigouvian subsidies, but it is inferior to an alternative set f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc; 0) for sc 2 (0; s)g
that reduces tari¤s and keeps the world price above bpw(s; 0). Lemma 4 is, however, insu¢ cient to exclude
the possibility that there exists an optimal agreement that raises tari¤s and keeps the world price lower
than bpw(s; 0) in some range of . Our new nding eliminates this possibility and shows that, for all  < ,
an optimal agreement prevents the use of positive tari¤s in the region f(s; ) : bpw(s; )  bpw(s; 0)g where
the use of fully Pigouvian subsidies can be achieved.
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b 2 (0; ). Then this agreement, satisfying the monotonicity, leaves out policy mixes in
the region f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) > bpw(s; 0)g for all   b. We show in the Appendix that
the optimality is contradicted; an alternative agreement can increase the global welfare
for   b by including an iso-world-price function as its policy subset in that region or
using the horizontal zero-tari¤ line,  = 0. Therefore, for all  < , an optimal agreement
prevents the use of positive tari¤s in the region f(s; ) : bpw(s; )  bpw(s; 0)g where the
use of fully Pigouvian subsidies can be achieved. We may rephrase this nding as in the
following lemma:
Lemma 6 An optimal agreement imposes bounds on positive tari¤s to the extent that the
home government restricts domestic e¢ ciency in some states; in an optimal agreement,
for all  < , if () > 0, then bpw(s(); ()) > bpw(s; 0).
The nding in Lemma 6 is not common in the literature. In particular, domestic
e¢ ciency remains untainted regardless of tari¤ levels in the terms-of-trade models that
provide an e¢ ciency foundation of the GATT rules. A core regulatory feature of the
GATT rules is that the agreement tends to constrain tari¤s while it largely leaves domes-
tic policies to the governments discretion. This asymmetric treatment over two policy
instruments is well supported by the targeting principle as in Ederington (2001). Edering-
ton shows that the most cooperative self-enforcing agreement is achieved when domestic
policies are set at the Pigouvian level to internalize the externality at the margin and tar-
i¤s are tailored to the critical level at which the self-enforcement constraint is binding. In
his model, the value of cooperation is maximized when the agreement allows a protective
measure only in the form of import tari¤s while keeping domestic policies undistorted.
3.3 Restriction on Domestic E¢ ciency
In this subsection, we present the restriction on domestic e¢ ciency in two respects: an
optimal agreement restricts domestic e¢ ciency (i) at the top (i.e., for the subinterval of
 adjoining the highest type ) and (ii) extensively over the entire interval [0; ].
The rst nding shows that an optimal agreement uses a rigid (state-independent)
zero-tari¤ policy mix at the top:16
16The proof of Lemma 7 is in the Appendix. Notice that our optimality criterion does not restrict the
policy mix for the highest type  to the zero-tari¤ policy mix (bs; 0), because the expected global welfare
remains constant as long as policy mixes for all  <  remain constant even if the policy mix for the
measure-zero state  moves from (bs; 0) to another incentive-compatible point that may have a positive
tari¤. Thus, the result in Lemma 7 allows that (i) types  2 [c; ] pool at a point (bs; 0) and (ii) types
 2 [c; ) pool at (bs; 0) and the highest type  selects a separate incentive-compatible point (s(); ()).
In other words, any optimal agreement entails pooling at (bs; 0) for  2 [c; ] with probability 1.
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Lemma 7 An optimal agreement entails rigidity at the top; in an optimal agreement, for
some c < , the government selects a rigid zero-tari¤ policy mix (bs; 0) for all  2 [c; ).
We observed above that a state-contingent use of Pigouvian subsidies, although it
promotes domestic e¢ ciency, accompanies high tari¤s to satisfy the truth-telling incentive.
Lemma 7 uses the other side of the argument: a rigid use of subsidies at the top makes it
possible to satisfy the truth-telling incentive with zero tari¤s at the top and reduced tari¤s
for types below the top. Intuitively, given a rigid subsidy at the top, even when tari¤s
are reduced, the government cannot raise subsidies above the rigid level. This nding
makes an additional point in conjunction with Lemma 5: an optimal agreement, allowing
a rigid subsidy, achieves zero tari¤s at the top while it, allowing a positive tari¤, uses the
Pigouvian subsidy at the lowest type where the world price reaches the highest level.
The second nding shows that an optimal agreement restricts domestic e¢ ciency ex-
tensively over the entire interval [0; ]. We begin by associating an agreement that keeps
a market-access preservation rule with an agreement in which the home government has
the exibility to select policies as long as it preserves the world price at a constant level.
In particular, we say that an agreement keeps a market-access preservation rule when it
uses an iso-world-price function as its policy set:17
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc; 0) for sc 2 (0; s)g: (21)
The agreement entails the use of Pigouvian subsidies in a subinterval of , since under the
policy set (21), there exists c 2 (0; ) that satises sc = cv0(Q(sc; 0)). The government
with  2 [0; c) thus uses Pigouvian subsidies and the government with  2 [c; ] pools at
the endpoint (sc; 0). It is clear that the policy set (21) is continuous and contains a tension
between two policy objectives: an increase in sc expands the range of using Pigouvian
subsidies, but it raises tari¤s. The following lemma describes how an agreement optimally
balances two policy objectives when its policy set includes a discontinuity (jump):
Lemma 8 If an optimal agreement has a policy set that includes a jump between two
neighboring policy mixes (s1;  1) and (s2;  2) with s2 > s1, then there exist 1 and 2 such
that the government with 1 uses the Pigouvian subsidy and is indi¤erent between the two
policy mixes,
s1 = 1v
0(Q(s1;  1)) and W (s1;  1; 1) = W (s2;  2; 1); (22)
17Given the optimality criterion, we focus on sc 2 (0; s) since for sc  s or sc = 0, the agreement
is suboptimal. Notice also that Lemma 7 is not su¢ cient to support the suboptimality of keeping a
market-access preservation rule; as we show below, the policy set (21) entails a rigid zero-tari¤ policy
mix (sc; 0) at the top, but it is still suboptimal.
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and the government with  2 (1; 2] pools at (s2;  2).
We show in the Appendix that two equations in (22) are followed by the optimality
criterion; an agreement could otherwise improve domestic e¢ ciency without a¤ecting
terms-of-trade motivations. This result means that, if an optimal agreement induces a
jump between two neighboring policy mixes (s1;  1) and (s2;  2), then it allows a rigidity
at (s2;  2) in a subinterval (1; 2], and instead reduces tari¤s and raises the world price
for types below the subinterval.
Referring back to the policy set (21), we now suppose that an alternative policy set
allows the same rigid endpoint (sc; 0) in a new subinterval (c; 
c) as well as in the existing
pooling subinterval [c; ]. The alternative set then brings the global-welfare gain for those
types   c that select Pigouvian subsidies with reduced tari¤s along a new iso-world-
price function, but it causes the global-welfare loss for those types  2 (c; c) that newly
pool at the original endpoint (sc; 0). We compare the marginal global-welfare gain and loss
when c falls slightly from 
c: for a small decrease in c, the marginal global-welfare gain
associated with the tari¤ reduction for types   c remains strictly positive, because this
gain is generated by those types whose choices depart from the original iso-world-price
function (21), but the marginal global-welfare loss associated with the new pooling for
types  2 (c; c) approaches zero, because this loss is caused by those types whose choices
stay on the original iso-world-price function (21). Intuitively, the rst-order di¤erentiation
of the home welfare at the original policy mixes is zero on the original iso-world-price
function where the foreign welfare is held constant, and for c su¢ ciently close to 
c, the
rst-order di¤erentiation of the home welfare at the new pooling point approaches zero
since the new pooling point approaches the original choices along the function (21).
We can further show that an agreement is suboptimal if it includes an iso-world-price
function as its policy subset and entails the use of Pigouvian subsidies in a subinterval
of types. This policy subset can always be shifted to reduce tari¤s and raise the world
price by allowing a new pooling (rigidity) at the top. We nd that such a shift of the
original policy subset improves the expected global welfare due to the state-dependent
substitutability between two policy instruments: for the same rigid policy mix (the same
domestic production) at the top, the home government with a lower type is willing to
accept a lower tari¤ and o¤er greater market access. With a probabilistic measure , we
can approximate the degree to which an optimal agreement restricts domestic e¢ ciency:
the use of Pigouvian subsidies is limited to measure-zerostates (separate points) in the
interval [0; ],
f : s() = v0(Q(s(); ()))g = 0;
in an optimal agreement. We report our ndings:
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Proposition 2 An agreement is suboptimal if it includes an iso-world-price function as
its policy subset and entails the use of Pigouvian subsidies in a subinterval of types; in an
optimal agreement, the home government uses Pigouvian subsidies only in measure-zero
states.
Notice also that there exist forces in favor of using state-contingent subsidies at the
bottom where  approaches zero and the world price approximates the highest level.
Indeed, an optimal agreement selects the Pigouvian subsidy s(0) = 0 and allows state-
contingency at the bottom as we show in the Appendix. At the same time, however,
having no iso-world-price function as its policy subset while satisfying the monotonicity,
an optimal agreement entails a state-contingent policy subset at the bottom for  2 [0; c]
such that s(0) = 0, and for  2 (0; c], s() is above the Pigouvian subsidy and the world
price strictly decreases in . This subset at the bottom is su¢ ciently short; the subset
would otherwise be shifted to reduce tari¤s by allowing a new pooling at the top.18 The
state-contingent subset at the bottom, on the other hand, continues to exist because the
net benet of shortening the subset dissipates as c becomes su¢ ciently close to 0; the
interval [0; c] that generates the marginal global-welfare gain associated with the tari¤
reduction approaches zero, while the marginal global-welfare loss associated with the
new pooling does not approach zero because the original subset is not an iso-world-price
function.
We can use numerical examples and argue that the agreement that includes an iso-
world-price function as its policy subset can be easily improved by including an additional
rigidity at the top. For numerical convenience, suppose that  is uniformly distributed
on [0; 1] and that all functions are linear: v(Q; ) = Q with the Pigouvian subsidy
, D(pd) = 10   pd and Q(ps) = 1
2
ps for the home country and D(pd) = 10   pd
and Q(ps) = ps for the foreign country. Among the agreements that keep the world
price at a constant level, the optimal agreement has one iso-world-price line segment for
 2 [0; 0:68] and a rigid point (bs;b) = (0:68; 0). This agreement can be improved by
involving one jump and an additional rigidity at the top: an iso-world-price segment for
 2 [0; 0:478] and a rigid point (0:697; 0). This agreement can be further improved by
having two rigid points: an iso-world-price segment for  2 [0; 0:335] and two rigid points,
(0:508; 0:052) and (0:705; 0).
The WTOs strict treatment of domestic subsidies has not been well received. A cen-
18We can show that, if  is distributed over a su¢ ciently large support [0; ], then the state-contingent
subset at the bottom for  2 [0; c] cannot reach the pooling point at the top for  2 [c; ), c < c,
in an optimal agreement. Intuitively, the equality c = 
c holds only if the policy set consists of only
one state-contingent set for all  < , and for a su¢ ciently large support [0; ], the state-contingent set
cannot be too short to be improved by allowing a new pooling at the top.
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tral reason is that the consequent restriction on domestic e¢ ciency is hardly compatible
with the existing theory that is essentially rooted in the targeting principle. The existing
terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements provides an e¢ ciency rationale for trade agree-
ments to adopt a shallow integration: international e¢ ciency can be achieved by tari¤
negotiations alone under the non-violation complaints that secure market access against
potential erosion from subsequent behind-the-border measures. In regard to the treat-
ment of domestic subsidies, the existing terms-of-trade theory supports the GATT-type
market-access preservation rule. Under the rule, the home government has the exibility
to select its domestic policies up to the point where its policies start eroding the market-
access commitments achieved by the preceding tari¤ negotiations, and the government
can then position its domestic subsidy to an e¢ cient level. In our model, by contrast,
we establish the suboptimality of keeping a market-access preservation rule: there always
exists a superior agreement that restricts domestic e¢ ciency further and expands market
access beyond the level achieved by an agreement that keeps a market-access preservation
rule. A key policy implication of our nding is that an optimal agreement allows no such
exibility or discretion over subsidies implied by the GATT rules and that the WTOs
restriction on domestic subsidies may be a necessary regulatory step to expand market
access beyond the level achieved under the GATT rules.
3.4 Deep Integration
In this subsection, we show that the policy mixes selected by the home government under
an optimal agreement would not be selected by the government under a tari¤-only or
subsidy-only agreement. This nding means that the expected global welfare generated
by an optimal agreement cannot be achieved by negotiations on tari¤s alone or subsidies
alone. An optimal agreement thus constrains both tari¤s and subsidies.
Suppose that (sopt();  opt()) represents the policy mix selected by the home govern-
ment with  under an optimal agreement. We proceed to consider an agreement that
constrains subsidies alone and species only available subsidies that are selected from
the subsidy schedule sopt(). This agreement then o¤ers available subsidies in the range
[0; sopt()], where 0 is the lowest level given sopt(0) = 0 and sopt() is the highest level.
We focus on  = 0 and observe that this agreement must contain a subsidy range [0; bs]
that satises bpw(s; 0) > bpw(s; 0) for all s 2 [0; bs]. We can select the policy point (bs; 0) and
shift the decreasing function s = v0(Q(s; )) to the right until the function crosses the
policy point (bs; 0). Then there exists type b 2 (0; ) that satises bs = bv0(Q(bs; 0)). Thus,
under the subsidy-only agreement where subsidies are available in the range [0; bs], there
exists some  2 [0;b] for which the government will select the Nash tari¤ N(), which
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keeps the world price below bpw(s; 0). It then follows from Lemma 6 that the agreement
is suboptimal. The intuition behind this result is based on the targeting principle: with
no constraint on tari¤s, the government could use the best instrument to capture the
terms-of-trade gain, the tari¤, and lower the world price too much.
We next consider an agreement that constrains tari¤s alone and species only avail-
able tari¤s that are selected from the tari¤ schedule  opt(). This agreement then o¤ers
available tari¤s in the range [0;  opt], where 0 is the lowest tari¤ at the top and  opt is the
highest available tari¤.19 We focus on s = 0 and observe that this agreement must contain
a tari¤ range [0;b ] that satises bpw(0; ) > bpw(s; 0) for all  2 [0;b ]. We project this tari¤
range [0;b ] on the iso-world-price function bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0) with two separate end-
points, (s1;b) and (s2; 0), where s1 and s2 are dened by bpw(s1;b) = bpw(s2; 0) = bpw(s; 0).
Then there exist types 1 and 2 such that s1 = 1v0(Q(s1;b)) and s2 = 2v0(Q(s2; 0)).
From bpw(s2; 0) = bpw(s; 0), we have s2 = s and so 2 = . Thus, under the tari¤-only
agreement where tari¤s are available in the range [0;b ], there exists some  <  for which
the government will raise its subsidy above the Pigouvian level and lower the world price
below bpw(s; 0). It then follows from Lemma 6 that the agreement is suboptimal. Under
the agreement, the government with  will raise its subsidy above the Pigouvian level as
long as its Nash tari¤ N() is higher than b . The intuition behind this result is that,
given that tari¤s are necessarily constrained as implied by the targeting principle, if the
constraint on domestic subsidies were lifted, then domestic distortions would be prevalent
since the government could use an inferior instrument to capture the terms-of-trade gain,
the domestic subsidy.
We use a fairly standard terms-of-trade model in that the terms-of-trade externality is
the sole cross-border externality and equilibrium prices are determined by market-clearing
conditions. We then conrm that an optimal agreement adopts a deep integration: an
optimal agreement goes beyond tari¤ negotiations and includes constraints on the use
of domestic subsidies. Our nding thus shows that the existing terms-of-trade theorys
support for shallow integration may be weakened when a terms-of-trade model has an
additional source of ine¢ ciency, private information, that requires the use of domestic
subsidies to be incentive compatible. Notice also that an optimal agreement in our model
still allows state-contingent subsidies with positive tari¤s though it entails no iso-world-
price function as its policy subset.20 Under the SCM agreement, however, a domestic
19The monotonicity of opt() is not ensured, but we are sure that opt(0) > 0 and opt() = 0 at the
top for  2 [c; ).
20For example, an optimal agreement allows state-contingent non-Pigouvian subsidies at the bottom for
 2 (0; c] and also Pigouvian subsidies in separate states. In addition, the state-contingency (separating)
at the bottom implies that an optimal agreement allows a strictly positive subsidy with probability 1.
24
production subsidy is actionable irrespective of whether the subsidy nullies or impairs the
market-access commitments made by preceding tari¤ negotiations. Thus, a government
that uses a domestic production subsidy is under pressure to remove the subsidy or at
least its adverse e¤ects regardless of the extent to which the subsidy is needed for domestic
e¢ ciency. This observation indicates that while it takes a necessary regulatory measure,
the SCM agreement may be perceived as an overly restrictive regulation.
4 Conclusions
The WTOs strict treatment of domestic subsidies has not been well received in the ex-
isting literature. The underlying reason is that the consequent restriction on domestic
e¢ ciency is hardly compatible with the existing theory of government intervention under
which the primary objective of using domestic subsidies, domestic e¢ ciency, is not sacri-
ced for another objective. In this paper, we develop a terms-of-trade model of agreements
when the home government has private information about the magnitude of a legitimate
subsidy with which to remedy under-production distortion. When governments maximize
the expected global welfare, they face a tension between the objective of promoting do-
mestic e¢ ciency and the objective of reducing import protection in tari¤s. An agreement
looks for a proper balance between exibility and discipline in its treatment of domestic
subsidies, observing that (i) an agreement in favor of granting exibility promotes domes-
tic e¢ ciency, but it accompanies high import tari¤s, and (ii) an agreement in favor of
imposing restrictions reduces import tari¤s, but it su¤ers from domestic ine¢ ciency.
We argue that the GATT rules were quite exible in the treatment of domestic sub-
sidies: subsequent to tari¤ negotiation, the home government was permitted to alter its
domestic subsidies as long as such policy adjustments preserve market access at the nego-
tiated level. We then establish the suboptimality of keeping a market-access preservation
rule, and assert that the additional restriction imposed by WTO on the use of domestic
subsidies may be a necessary regulatory step to increase market access beyond the level
achieved under the GATT rules. We also emphasize that an optimal agreement con-
strains both tari¤s and subsidies: the expected global welfare generated by an optimal
agreement cannot be achieved by negotiations on tari¤ or subsidy alone. The subop-
timality of constraining only one instrument is somewhat related to the literature that
investigates whether a trade agreement can increase its enforcement power by linking do-
mestic policy such as labor and environmental standard to tari¤ negotiation and allowing
cross-retaliation between policy instruments. Bajona and Ederington (2012), Ederington
(2002) and Limao (2005) belong to this line of research. Apart from enforcement issue,
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our model shows that an agreement can achieve incentive compatibility in a way that
maximizes the expected global welfare only when it constrains both tari¤s and subsidies.
Our ndings build on a fairly standard setting and may thus hold in other terms-
of-trade models in which privately-informed governments cooperate over two policy in-
struments. An immediate example is that our model can be directly reformulated as a
lobbying model in which government intervention is justied by domestic political pressure
as in Baldwin (1987). This model accommodates a political-economy externality by plac-
ing an additional privately-informed weight  2 [0; ] on producer surplus, (1 + )(bps).
In comparison with our original model, the external-value term has now changed from
v(Q(bps)) to (bps) in the home welfare function.21 The marginal impact of policy in-
strument x 2 fs; g on the external value has also changed from @v(Q(bps))
@x
= v0(Q)@Q
@x
to @(bps)
@x
=  @Q
@x
. Hence, the Pigouvian subsidy takes a linear form, s = , which makes
analyses much simpler. The parameter range in which the incentive problem occurs must
be redened, but we can readily conrm that our original analyses are qualitatively un-
a¤ected.
We nally emphasize that our model misses the following important considerations.
First, the characterization of an optimal agreement may look di¤erent in the setting
where production shocks are rather persistent and governments privately observe those
shocks before writing an agreement. The analysis then becomes quite complicated, since a
countrys action may signal its private information and thus a¤ect the beliefs of its trading
partners, as Bagwell (2009) shows in his analysis of a self-enforcing agreement on tari¤s
alone. Second, our model focuses on the home governments intervention in its import
sector, holding constant the foreign governments intervention that might otherwise be
motivated by privately-informed external values of producing its export good. This foreign
intervention makes it di¢ cult to verify both governmentstruth-telling incentives given
that the home (foreign) welfare is a¤ected also by the foreign (home) intervention that is
conditional on foreign (home) external values. Our analysis avoids such complications, but
all agreements considered in our paper satisfy both governmentstruth-telling incentives
by holding the foreign intervention constant and thus eliminating the foreign governments
potential gain from telling a lie. Third, a natural generalization of our analysis is a general-
equilibrium model in which the privately-informed government allocates resources across
21The home welfare function now becomes
W (s;  ; )  CS(bpd) + (bps) +  M(s; )  s Q(bps) + (bps):
For the policy-mix region below the Nash policies, we can verify that the SCP holds by measuring how
the gradient vector (@W (s; ;)@s ;
@W (s; ;)
@ ) changes with , (
@Q(s;)
@s ;
@Q(s;)
@ ), where
@Q(s;)
@s >
@Q(s;)
@ > 0
hold independently of .
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di¤erent sectors under its budget constraint. More research is necessary to examine what
will be a proper balance between an international objective of expanding market-access
levels and the domestic objective of reducing allocative distortions.22
5 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. With preliminary results of @bpw
@s
, @bpw
@
, @Q
@s
, @Q
@
, @M
@s
and @M
@
in the
main text, we establish the rst-best policy mix for  that maximizes WG(s;  ; ) in (9).
The rst-order condition for each policy instrument x 2 fs; g becomes
@WG(s;  ; )
@x
= 
@M
@x
+ [v0(Q)  s]@Q
@x
= 0: (23)
Thus, the rst-best policy mix for  is determined by
s = v0(Q(s; 0)) and  = 0:
If  = 0, then s = 0 and if  > 0, then there exists s > 0 that satises the equation
s = v0(Q(s; 0)); the existence of s is ensured since the RHS of this equation, v0(Q(s; 0)),
is strictly positive and decreasing in s, v00(Q(s; 0))@Q
@s
< 0, while the LHS is strictly
increasing along the 45 degree line. The uniqueness of the rst-best is followed by the
strict concavity of WG(s;  ; ).
We next nd the Nash policy mix for  that maximizesW (s;  ; ), using the rst-order
condition for each x 2 fs; g,
@W (s;  ; )
@x
=  @bpw
@x
M + 
@M
@x
+ [v0(Q)  s]@Q
@x
= 0; (24)
The Nash policy mix for  is thus determined by
s = v0(Q(s; )) and (25)
 =
@bpw=@
@M=@
M =
@bpw=@s
@M=@s
M =
E(bpw)
E0(bpw) : (26)
The strict concavity ofW (s;  ; ) ensures the uniqueness of the crossing point that satises
(25) and (26) for all , if the crossing point exists. We thus show that the crossing point
exists. Suppose rst that  = 0. Then the equation s = v0(Q(s; )) becomes a vertical
22Our current paper greatly simplies the source of ine¢ ciencies: the private-informed government has
incentive to manipulate terms of trade with trade and domestic policies. It thus ignores other sources of
ine¢ ciencies: markets are imperfectly competitive, and subsidies are raised from distortionary taxation.
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line, s = 0, and there exists the tari¤  > 0 that satises  = E
(bpw)
E0(bpw) ; this tari¤ exists
since the RHS of the equation, E
(bpw)
E0(bpw) , is strictly positive and approaches zero if  becomes
su¢ ciently large and bpw becomes su¢ ciently low, while the LHS is strictly increasing along
the 45 degree line. Suppose next that  > 0. Then the equation s = v0(Q(s; )) becomes
a strictly decreasing function with the slope d
ds
< 0 as shown in (13). For this equation
s = v0(Q(s; )), if s! 0, then  !1 since the RHS is strictly positive and decreasing
in  , v00(Q(s; ))@Q
@
< 0, and if  ! 0, then s approaches the rst-best subsidy sE that
satises sE = v0(Q(sE; 0)). For the equation  = E
(bpw)
E0(bpw) , we nd that this equation may
not be a strictly decreasing function, but if E(bpw) is not too convex, then it becomes a
strictly decreasing function with the slope:
d
ds
=   (E
00   E0) @bpw
@s
E0 + (E00   E0) @bpw
@
:
For this equation  = E
(bpw)
E0(bpw) , if s ! 0, then  is strictly positive and bounded, and if
s! sE, then  remains strictly positive. Hence, for  > 0, there exists the crossing point
that satises (25) and (26).
Proof of Lemma 2. We select a policy mix (s; ) from the set f(s; ) : s =
v0(Q(s; ))g and consider a new policy mix that has a higher  and keeps the same
s. For the same s, an increase in  decreases v0(Q) since v00(Q(s; ))@Q
@
< 0 and thus it
decreases the global welfare WG(s;  ; ):
@WG(s;  ; )
@
= 
@M
@
+ [v0(Q)  s]@Q
@
< 0:
Thus, the iso-global-welfare function that crosses the new policy mix has a lower value
than the original policy mix, which in turn indicates that WG(s;  ; ) decreases when
(s; ) moves closer to the Nash policy mix along the set f(s; ) : s = v0(Q(s; ))g. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We maximize the home welfare W (s;  ; ) subject to the con-
straint set: f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(; 0)g. The constraint set can be represented by a
strictly decreasing function  = (s). We plug the constraint into the home welfare:
W (s; (s); )  CS(bpd) + (bps) + (s) M(s; (s))  s Q(bps) + v(Q(bps));
where bpd = bpw(s; (s)) + (s) and bps = bpw(s; (s)) + (s) + s. Using @CS(bpd)
@s
=  D(bpd)@bpd
@s
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and @(bps)
@x
= Q(bps)@bps
@s
, we nd the di¤erentiation:
@W (s; (s); )
@s
= [Q D]

@bpw
@
d
@s
+
@bpw
@s

+ 
@M
@
d
ds
+ 
@M
@s
(27)
+ [v0(Q)  s]

@Q
@
d
ds
+
@Q
@s

:
Since the slope of the iso-world-price function is
d
@s
=  @bpw=@s
@bpw=@ =  @M=@s@M=@ ;
we can nd that the RHS of (27) is reduced to the last term:
@W (s; (s); )
@s
= [v0(Q)  s]

@Q
@
d
ds
+
@Q
@s

= [v0(Q)  s] Q
0D0
D0  Q0 : (28)
Since Q
0D0
D0 Q0 > 0, the home government with type  selects its policy mix that satises
s = v0(Q(s; (s))). Lastly, to conrm the result, we use Lagrange multiplier  and
maximizeW (s;  ; ) subject to the above constraint set. The rst-order condition becomes
 @bpw
@x
M + 
@M
@x
+ [v0(Q)  s]@Q
@x
  @bpw
@x
= 0 for x 2 fs; g:
Using @M
@x
= E0 @bpw
@x
, we nd the solution: s = v0(Q(s; )) and  = E
(bpw)+
E0(bpw) . Notice
that  < 0 under the assumption 1, whereby the home welfare W (s;  ; ) falls when the
iso-world-price function shifts down to raise bpw, while  = 0 at the Nash policies. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We consider a policy set:
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc; 0) for sc 2 (0; s)g; (29)
which approximates the original policy set (16) when sc ! s. Under this policy set,
there exists c 2 (0; ) for which the endpoint (sc; 0) is the rst-best policy mix, sc =
cv0(Q(sc; 0)). Thus, the government with  < c internalizes the a¤ected margin along
(29) and the government with  2 [c; ] pools at (sc; 0). The state-contingent policy
mix for  < c, denoted by (s(); ()), is determined by the crossing point of the iso-
world-price function (29) and s = v0(Q(s; )). For  < c, if sc rises, then the function
(29) shifts up and the crossing point moves away from the rst-best policy mix along the
set f(s; ) : s = v0(Q(s; ))g. Therefore, an increase in sc decreases the global welfare
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WG(s(); (); ) for  < c:
@WG(s(); (); )
@sc
< 0 for  < c: (30)
On the other hand, an increase in sc raises the global welfare WG(sc; 0; ) for  2 (c; ]:
@WG(sc; 0; )
@sc
= [v0(Q(sc; 0))  sc]@Q(s
c; 0)
@sc
= [   c]v0(Q(sc; 0))@Q(s
c; 0)
@sc
> 0: (31)
The expected global welfare under the alternative agreement becomesZ c
0
WG(s(); (); )dF () +
Z 
c
WG(sc; 0; )dF (): (32)
Given (s(c); (c)) = (sc; 0) and so WG(s(c); (c)) = WG(sc; 0) by construction, the
di¤erentiation of (32) with respect to c is reduced to Z c
0
@WG(s(); (); )
@sc
dF () +
Z 
c
@WG(sc; 0; )
@sc
dF ()
!
dsc
dc
; (33)
where sc = cv0(Q(sc; 0)) and thus
dsc
dc
=
v0(Q(sc; 0))
1  cv00(Q(sc; 0))@Q(sc;0)
@sc
> 0:
Now, for  2 (c; ], if c ! , then the di¤erentiation in (31) approaches zero while the
inequality in (30) remains strictly negative. Hence, using (33), we conclude that, if c
decreases slightly from , then the expected global welfare increases. 
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Given the monotonicityQ(s(2); (2))  Q(s(1); (1))
for 2 > 1, we establish the monotonicity of subsidy. Assume to the contrary that an
agreement allows s(2) < s(1) for some 2 > 1. Incentive compatibility of 1 then
implies that (s(2); (2)) must be in the region:
f(s; ) : W (s;  ; 1)  W (s(1); (1); 1), s < s(1) and Q(s; )  Q(s(1); (1))g:
Using the point (s(1); (1)), we next consider the iso-production function Q(s; ) =
Q(s(1); (1)) and the iso-world-price function bp(s; ) = bp(s(1); (1)) that cross the
point. Notice that the slope of the iso-production function is steeper than the slope of
the iso-world-price function, since we have
 @Q=@s@Q=@  > 1 >  Q0D0 Q0  from (5), (6) and (14).
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Thus, the policy mix (s(2); (2)) must also be in the region:
f(s; ) : W (s;  ; 1)  W (s(1); (1); 1), s < s(1) and bp(s; ) < bp(s(1); (1))g:
Now, we observe that the iso-welfare function for 2, W (s;  ; 2) = W (s(1); (1); 2),
crosses the iso-welfare function for 1, W (s;  ; 1) = W (s(1); (1); 1), from above at
the point (s(1); (1)) and that, for the government with 2, any policy mix in this
region is clearly less preferred to (s(1); (1)), which violates incentive compatibility.
(ii) We show that, in any optimal agreement, the world price is weakly decreasing in
. Suppose that an optimal agreement allows
bpw(s(2); (2)) > bpw(s(1); (1)) for 2 > 1: (34)
Then s(2)  s(1) follows by the monotonicity of subsidy. For the original policy set
that satises (34), we develop an alternative policy set that is superior to the original
policy set under three possible cases. In Case 1 and 2 below, we develop the alternative
policy set under the possibility that, for all  < 1, bpw(s(); ())  bpw(s(2); (2)) in the
original policy set. In Case 3, we show that any of the alternative policy sets considered
in Case 1 and 2 continues to be superior to the original policy set under the remaining
possibility that there exists type c < 1 such that bpw(s(c); (c)) > bpw(s(2); (2)) in
the original policy set.
Case 1: Suppose rst that the original policy set has (s(2); (2)) in the region:
f(s; ) : 2v0(Q(s; ))  sg: (35)
While preserving the original subset for s > s(2), we develop an alternative subset:
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s(2); (2)) for s  s(2)g: (36)
Given (35), incentive compatibility of the new policy set is ensured by incentive compat-
ibility of the original set; the home government with   2 will select its policy mix
from this new set. For all   2, this new set contains a policy mix that generates a
higher global welfare than does the original policy mix; the function v0(Q(s; )) = s for
all   2 crosses the iso-world-price function (36) that involves the higher world price.
Case 2: Suppose next that the original policy set has (s(2); (2)) in the region:
f(s; ) : 2v0(Q(s; )) > sg: (37)
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Letting (sE2 ; 0) represent the rst-best policy mix for 2 that satises 2v
0(Q(sE2 ; 0)) = s
E
2 ,
we consider two possibilities: (i) bpw(s(2); (2))  bpw(sE2 ; 0) and (ii) bpw(s(2); (2)) >bpw(sE2 ; 0). For (i), we dene a policy mix (bs;b) by bpw(bs;b) = bpw(s(2); (2)) and
2v
0(Q(bs;b)) = bs, and develop an alternative subset
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs;b) for s  bsg; (38)
while keeping the original subset for s > bs. This new subset (38) extends the original set
from (s(2); (2)) until it crosses the function 2v0(Q(s; )) = s. Given (37), incentive
compatibility of the new policy set is ensured by incentive compatibility of the original set;
the home government with   2 selects its policy mix along the iso-world-price function
(38) that entails the higher world price, which increases the expected global welfare.
For (ii), we dene a policy mix (bs; 0) by bpw(bs; 0) = bpw(s(2); (2)). This point (bs; 0)
satises s(2)  bs < sE2 . We have bs < sE2 since bpw(bs; 0) = bpw(s(2); (2)) > bpw(sE2 ; 0), and
we also have bs  s(2); bs > s(2) if (2) > 0, and bs = s(2) if (2) = 0. Observing that
there exists b 2 (0; 2) such that (bs; 0) is the rst-best policy mix for b, bv0(Q(bs; 0)) = bs,
we now construct an alternative subset
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs; 0) for s  bsg; (39)
while keeping the original subset for s > bs. Given (37), incentive compatibility of the new
policy set is ensured by incentive compatibility of the original set; the government with
  b selects state-contingent policy mixes along (39) and the government with  2 (b; 2]
pools at (bs; 0). Since it is evident that the iso-world-price function (39) generates a higher
global welfare for   b, the remaining proof focuses on the pooling point (bs; 0) for types
 2 (b; 2], and shows that the global welfare is higher at (bs; 0) than at the original point
for those types.
To obtain the proof, we rst observe that, along the horizontal line  = 0, the iso-
global-welfare functions for  2 (b; 2], WG(s;  ; ) = , have the slope:
 @W
G(s;  ; )=@s
@WG(s;  ; )=@

=0
=   [v
0(Q(s; 0))  s]@Q(s;0)
@s
[v0(Q(s; 0))  s]@Q(s;0)
@
=  1 + D
0(bpd(s; 0))
E0(bpw(s; 0)) <  1; (40)
where the rst equality is given by (23), and the second equality by (5) and (6). Notice
that, along the line  = 0, (a) the slopes of the iso-global-welfare functions are conditional
only on s (independent of ), and (b) for any s, those slopes are steeper than the slope of
the iso-world-price function,
d
ds
 =  Q0D0 Q0  < 1, for any (s; ) in (39). Thus, for type 2,
the global welfare is at least as high at the point (bs; 0) as at the original point (s(2); (2))
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that surely belongs to the new policy set (39) by construction. For the remaining types
 2 (b; 2), we next show that the global welfare is at least as high at the point (bs; 0) as
at the original point (s(); ()). Suppose that, under the original policy set, there exists
some  2 (b; 2) such that the global welfare is strictly lower at the point (bs; 0) than at
the original point (s(); ()): for some  2 (b; 2), the original point (s(); ()) belongs
to a set
f(s; ) : WG(s;  ; ) > WG(bs; 0; ) and s  s(2)g; (41)
where s  s(2) follows from the monotonicity of subsidy. Our proof begins by observing
that the iso-home-welfare function for  2 (b; 2] that crosses the point (bs; 0),W (s;  ; ) =
W (bs; 0; ), has the slope:
 @W (s;  ; )=@s
@W (s;  ; )=@

(s;)=(bs;0) =  
 @bpw(bs;0)
@s
M(bs; 0) + [v0(Q(bs; 0))  bs]@Q(bs;0)
@s
 @bpw(bs;0)
@
M(bs; 0) + [v0(Q(bs; 0))  bs]@Q(bs;0)
@
< 0; (42)
where the last inequality holds since v0(Q(bs; 0))   bs > 0 given bv0(Q(bs; 0)) = bs and
 2 (b; 2]. We compare the two slopes in (40) and (42) now at the same point (bs; 0) using
the inequalities,
[v0(Q(bs; 0))  bs]@Q(bs;0)
@s
[v0(Q(bs; 0))  bs]@Q(bs;0)
@
> 1 and   @bpw(bs; 0)
@
M(bs; 0) >  @bpw(bs; 0)
@s
M(bs; 0) > 0,
and nd that, for all  2 (b; 2], the slope of the global-iso-welfare function WG(s;  ; ) =
WG(bs; 0; ) is steeper than the slope of the iso-home-welfare functionW (s;  ; ) = W (bs; 0; )
at the point (bs; 0). This nding means that the home government with type 2 strictly
prefers the policy mixes in the set (41) that are assigned for some  2 (b; 2) to its original
policy mix (s(2); (2)), which contradicts incentive compatibility of the original policy
set. In other words, if there exists some  2 (b; 2) such that the global welfare is strictly
lower at the point (bs; 0) than at the point (s(); ()) under the original policy set, then
incentive compatibility of the original policy set will be violated since type 2 has incentive
to mimic some  2 (b; 2).
Case 3: Suppose now that, under the original policy set, there exists c < 1 such
that bpw(s(c); (c)) > bpw(s(2); (2)). Consider any of the alternative policy subsets
shown above. The alternative subset then crosses the iso-welfare function W (s;  ; c) =
W (s(c); (c); c) from above. Let this crossing point be (sc;  c). Then (sc;  c) becomes
an endpoint of the alternative subset that has the world price bpw(sc;  c), and type c is
indi¤erent between (s(c); (c)) and (sc;  c). We can also nd from the alternative set
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that there exists type 0c > c such that (sc;  c) satises 
0
cv
0(Q(sc;  c)) = sc; thus, the
alternative set entails pooling at (sc;  c) for  2 (c; 0c). Now, out of the a¤ected range
 2 (c; 2], we can focus on the range  2 (c; 0c) for the proof, since the remaining types
 2 [0c; 2] select state-contingent policy mixes along the alternative subset that has the
higher world price bpw(sc;  c). For comparison, note that, for types  2 (c; 0c), the original
policy mix must be in the region,
f(s; ) : W (s;  ; c)  W (s(c); (c); c) and bpw(s; )  bpw(sc;  c)g;
and hence in the region f(s; ) : s > v0(Q(s; ))g. We complete Case 3 by following three
steps. First, for any (s; ) in the region f(s; ) : s > v0(Q(s; ))g, a decrease in tari¤
increases the global welfare:
@WG(s;  ; )
@
= 
@M
@
+ [v0(Q(s; ))  s]@Q
@
< 0: (43)
Second, we compare two options that have the same foreign welfare: (i) given the original
mix (s(); ()), the home government with  2 (c; 0c) is restrictedto keep the original
subsidy s = s() but select a tari¤  lower than () from the policy subset,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc;  c) for all s  scg; (44)
and (ii) the government with  2 (c; 0c) is allowed to select any policy mix from the
subset (44). This option (ii) then generates at least as high home welfare as (i). Together,
those rst and second steps mean that the global welfare for  2 (c; 0c) is higher in (44)
than in the original policy mix. Third, the government with  2 (c; 0c), either under the
alternative subset or under (44), pools at the same point (sc;  c) while keeping the foreign
welfare constant. Hence, the expected global welfare is higher under the alternative policy
set. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Given s(0) = 0 in the main text, we here show that (0) > 0 in
an optimal agreement. We rst show that an optimal policy set cannot contain only one
policy mix. If a policy set allows only one policy mix (bs;b), then the government must
pool at the rigid (state-independent) policy mix (bs;b) regardless of . For prices constant
for all , the expected global welfare becomes
EWG(bs;b ; ) = Z 
0
WG(bs;b ; )dF () = WG(bs;b ;E[]):
The best rigid policy mix (bs;b) that maximizes EWG(bs;b ; ) must be the rst-best
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policy mix for the type b = E[] = R 
0
dF (), which is the policy mix (bs; 0) wherebs = E[]v0(Q(bs; 0)). This best rigid policy mix (bs; 0) is, however, inferior to the iso-world-
price function that keeps the original world price bpw(bs; 0),
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs; 0)g;
since under this function, the government with   E[] uses Pigouvian subsidies without
causing the foreign countrys terms-of-trade deterioration, and the government with  >
E[] pools at the original policy mix (bs; 0). Hence, an optimal policy set cannot contain
only one policy mix.
Now, for the proof of (0) > 0, assume to the contrary that (0) = 0 in an optimal
agreement. The policy set then contains the policy point (0; 0) that entails the highest
possible world price. The policy set that contains (0; 0) must also contain at least one
more policy mix in the region f(s; ) : W (s;  ; 0)  W (0; 0; 0)g, including the policy point
(s2;  2) that entails the second highest world price. We develop an alternative policy set
under two scenarios. First, suppose that (0; 0) is selected only by type 0. The policy
set can then increase the expected global welfare by including an iso-world-price function
with the second highest world price up to the point (s2;  2),
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s2;  2) for s  s2g;
given that probability of having the highest world price is zero, P ( = 0) = 0. Second,
suppose that (0; 0) is selected by a range of types,  2 [0; x] for some x > 0. We can then
select type b  R x
0
dF () and its rst-best policy (bs; 0) that satises bs = bv0(Q(bs; 0)) and
maximizes Z x
0
WG(bs; 0; )dF () = WG(bs; 0;b): (45)
Note that 0 < b < x since 0 < b  R x
0
dF () = xF (x) R x
0
F ()d < x. We complete the
second scenario in two steps. First, we consider an alternative policy set that replaces (0; 0)
with (bs; 0). We then observe that, under the alternative set, the government with  2 [0; x]
prefers (bs; 0) to any original policy mix in the region f(s; ) : W (s;  ;x)  W (0; 0;x)g, and
observe further that the point (bs; 0) maximizes the value (45). The potential incentive
for types  > x to switch from their original choices to (bs; 0) also acts to increase the
global welfare for  > x, since the consequent home-welfare gain improves the foreign
countrys terms of trade for those types. Thus, this alternative policy set is superior
to the original set. Second, we can improve it further by including an iso-world-price
function up to the point (bs; 0): f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs; 0) for s  bsg. The government
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with  2 [0;b] then uses Pigouvian subsidies without causing the foreign countrys terms-
of-trade deterioration. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that an optimal agreement allows (e) > 0 andbpw(s(e); (e))  bpw(s; 0) for some e 2 (0; ). Given bpw(s(0); (0)) > bpw(s; 0) in Lemma 5,
the original agreement has a type x 2 [0;e):
x = supf : bpw(s(); ()) > bpw(s; 0)g:
We consider the original policy set under two possibilities:
Case 1: Suppose that the iso-welfare function for the type x,W (s;  ;x) = W (s(x); (x);x),
crosses the iso-world-price function,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0)g; (46)
from below at a point (bs;b) where b > 0. This crossing point (bs;b) is dened by
W (bs;b ;x) = W (s(x); (x);x) and bpw(bs;b) = bpw(s; 0):
Then there exists b > x that satises bs = bv0(Q(bs;b)). We rst modify the original set
by including an iso-world-price function for s  bs,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0) for s  bsg; (47)
while preserving the original subset for s < bs. This alternative set satises incentive
compatibility: for  2 (x;b), the government pools at (bs;b), and for  2 [b; ], it makes
choices along (47) (while for   x, it preserves the original choices). For comparison,
notice that the original policy subset for  2 (x;b) is in the region,
f(s; ) : W (s;  ;x)  W (s(x); (x);x) and bpw(s; )  bpw(bs;b)g;
and hence in the region f(s; ) : s > v0(Q(s; ))g.
We next make a further modication by shifting the subset (47) to increase the world
price,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc; 0) for s  bs0g; (48)
while preserving the original subset for s < bs0. This new subset replaces the previous
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endpoints of (47), (bs;b) and (s; 0), with the new endpoints (bs0;b 0) and (sc; 0):
W (bs0;b 0;x) = W (s(x); (x);x) and bpw(bs0;b 0) = bpw(sc; 0) > bpw(s; 0);
where bs0 < bs and sc < s. Under the new policy set, the home government pools at
(bs0;b 0) for  2 (x;b0) and makes choices along (48) for  2 [b0; c) while it pools at (sc; 0)
for  2 [c; ]. Let (s(); ()) represent the state-contingent choice made by  2 [b0; c).
Given (bs0;b 0) = (s(b0); (b0)) and (s(c); (c)) = (sc; 0) by construction, the di¤erentiation
of the expected global welfare with respect to c is reduced to
Z b0
x
@WG(bs0;b 0; )
@c
dF () +
Z c
b0
@WG(s(); (); )
@c
dF () +
Z 
c
@WG(sc; 0; )
@c
dF ():
Adopting the same procedure used for the proof of Lemma 4, we can show that, for c
su¢ ciently close to , the second term remains strictly negative and third term approaches
zero. For the rst term, the inequality for c close to , @W
G(bs0;b 0;)
@c
< 0 for  2 (x;b0), is
given by the three steps used for Case 3 in the proof of Proposition 1: the new pooling
point generates a higher global welfare since it involves a higher world price while locating
in the region f(s; ) : s > v0(Q(s; ))g. In summary, if c decreases slightly from , the
expected global welfare becomes higher with the new policy set, which contradicts the
optimality of the original agreement.
Case 2: Suppose next that the iso-welfare function for x, W (s;  ;x) = W (s(x); (x);x),
crosses the horizontal line,  = 0. This case occurs either (i) when the iso-welfare function
crosses the horizontal line only once or (ii) when it crosses two points, (s1; 0) and (s2; 0):
s1 < s2 and W (s1; 0;x) = W (s2; 0;x) = W (s(x); (x);x):
For (i), we can focus on the case in which the iso-welfare function for x is tangent to the
horizontal line at (s; 0); if the tangent point is not (s; 0), then the iso-welfare function
crosses the iso-world-price function (46) from below at a positive tari¤, which is subsumed
by Case 1. Now, given the case, if an agreement allows (s; ) with  > 0 and bpw(s; ) bpw(s; 0) for any  2 (x; ), then the policy mix (s; ) must have s > s. However, it follows
from (23) that, for all , any policy mix with  > 0 and s > s is inferior to the tangent
point (s; 0). The original policy set can thus be improved by replacing the policy mix with
the point (s; 0) while keeping incentive compatibility. For (ii), we can focus on the case
in which s1  s  s2; if s1 > s or s2 < s, then the iso-welfare function crosses (46) from
below at a positive tari¤, which is subsumed by Case 1. Given the case, if an agreement
allows (s; ) with  > 0 and bpw(s; )  bpw(s; 0) for any  2 (x; ), then the policy mix
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must have s > s2 and thus s > s. Now, for the same reason as in (i), for all , the policy
mix with  > 0 and s > s2 is inferior to the policy point (s2; 0). The original policy set
can thus be improved by replacing the policy mix with the point (s2; 0) while keeping
incentive compatibility. 
Proof of Lemma 7. The result has two parts. First, an optimal agreement uses
a rigid policy mix (bs;b) for  2 [c; ) for some c < . Assume to the contrary that
an optimal agreement includes a state-contingent (non-rigid) policy subset at the top.
This subset must be a function that satises the monotonicity in subsidy and the world
price. We may thus denote two endpoints of this subset as (s1;  1) and (s2;  2), where
s1 < s2 and bpw(s1;  1)  bpw(s2;  2). We consider three possibilities: (i) bpw(s2;  2) >bpw(s; 0), (ii) bpw(s2;  2) = bpw(s; 0) and (iii) bpw(s2;  2) < bpw(s; 0). For (i), there exists
type b <  such that s2 is the Pigouvian subsidy for b, s2 = bv0(Q(s2;  2)). Then the
government with  2 (b; ) pools at (s2;  2), which contradicts the assumption. For (ii),
we must have  2 = 0 and so (s2;  2) = (s; 0), since Lemma 6 shows that no optimal
agreement allows bpw(s2;  2) = bpw(s; 0) and  2 > 0 for any  < . In this case, the
state-contingent policy subset at the top must have a atter slope than the iso-world-
price function bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0), since the subset would otherwise include a point (bs;b)
that satises bpw(bs;b)  bpw(s; 0) and b > 0 for some  <  and thus violates the nding
in Lemma 6. Now, the subset that has the endpoint (s; 0) with a atter slope than
the function bpw(s; ) = bpw(s; 0) must entail pooling at the top, which contradicts the
assumption. For (iii), we consider the policy subset that includes a state-contingent
horizontal line segment in the region f(s; ) : s > s and  = 0g. This policy set contradicts
the optimality assumption: it can be improved by replacing the horizontal line segment
beyond the point (s; 0) with a point on the segment with the lowest subsidy, since it
follows from (23) that the global welfareWG(s;  ; ) decreases when s increases above the
Pigouvian subsidy given  = 0.
Second, having a rigid mix (bs;b) at the top, an optimal agreement achieves zero tari¤s
at the top, b = 0. Assume to the contrary that the rigid mix (bs;b) at the top has b > 0.
Lemma 6 then implies bpw(bs;b) > bpw(s; 0). We develop an alternative policy set that
includes an iso-world-price function from the point (bs;b) to (s0; 0):
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs;b) for s 2 [bs; s0]g; (49)
where s0 is dened by bpw(bs;b) = bpw(s0; 0). There exist b <  and 0 <  such thatbs = bv0(Q(bs;b)) and s0 = 0v0(Q(s0; 0)). Now, we nd that the alternative set increases
the expected global welfare: under the original policy set, having the point (bs;b) that
38
entails the lowest world price for all  < , the home government with  2 [b; 0] pools at
(bs;b), but under the alternative policy set, the home government with  2 [b; 0] selects
Pigouvian subsidies along (49) while keeping the world price at the original level bpw(bs;b).
Hence, the original agreement is suboptimal. 
Proof of Lemma 8. We establish the two equalities in the lemma. Suppose that
the government with 1 selects (s1;  1). Incentive compatibility implies W (s1;  1; 1) 
W (s2;  2; 1). IfW (s1;  1; 1) > W (s2;  2; 1), then the original policy set can be improved
by newly including an iso-world-price function between (bs;b) and (s2;  2), where (bs;b) is
dened by W (bs;b ; 1) = W (s1;  1; 1) and bpw(bs;b) = bpw(s2;  2). Thus, the equality
W (s1;  1; 1) = W (s2;  2; 1) is imposed by optimality. Now, for the other equality s1 =
1v
0(Q(s1;  1)), we observe that, since there is a jump between (s1;  1) and (s2;  2) with
s2 > s1 and W (s1;  1; 1) = W (s2;  2; 1), the monotonicity of the world price impliesbpw(s1;  1) > bpw(s2;  2). Suppose rst that s1 < 1v0(Q(s1;  1)). We can then select a new
point (bs;b) dened by
W (s1;  1; 1) = W (s2;  2; 1) = W (bs;b ; 1) and bs = 1v0(Q(bs;b)): (50)
This new point (bs;b) must satisfy
bpw(bs;b) > bpw(s1;  1) and s1 < bs < s2:
The original policy set can thus be improved by including an iso-world-price function
with a higher world price for s  bs, f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs;b) for s  bsg, while
keeping the original set for s > bs. In addition, if there exists type c 2 (0; 1) such thatbpw(s(c); (c)) > bpw(bs;b) in the original policy set, then we can follow Case 3 in the
proof of Proposition 1 to show that there exists an improvement on the original policy
set. Suppose next that s1 > 1v0(Q(s1;  1)). We can then select the new point (bs;b)
dened by (50) that satises
bpw(bs;b) > bpw(s1;  1) and bs < s1 < s2:
The remaining proof is the same as above. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We consider two cases (a) and (b) in Step 1 to show that
the use of Pigouvian subsidies on an iso-world-price function is not allowed in an optimal
agreement. In Step 2, we establish that an optimal agreement includes a state-contingent
(separating) policy subset at the bottom.
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Step 1 (a): Suppose that an agreement has an iso-world-price function as the policy set
for all :
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(sc;  c) for s 2 [0; sc]g: (51)
We can restrict attention to the policy set with bpw(sc;  c) > bpw(s; 0) given Lemma 6.
Since there exists type c 2 (0; ) that satises sc = cv0(Q(sc;  c)), the government with
 2 [0; c] selects Pigouvian subsidies s = v0(Q(s; )) along the function (51). We develop
an alternative set that includes a jump and has two separate subsets: the government with
 2 [0; 0c] selects Pigouvian subsidies along a new iso-world-price function,
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s0c;  0c) for s  s0cg;
and the government with  2 (0c; c) newly pools at the original endpoint (sc;  c). From
Lemma 8, we know that the jump is made such that the type 0c uses the Pigouvian
subsidy and is indi¤erent between (s0c; 
0
c) and (sc;  c):
s0c = 
0
cv
0(Q(s0c; 
0
c)) and W (s
0
c; 
0
c; 
0
c) = W (sc;  c; 
0
c):
We now measure how the slope of the iso-welfare function that crosses the point (sc;  c),
W (s;  ; ) = W (sc;  c; ), changes with : from the inequality (19) in the main text,
we know that even a marginal decrease in  makes the negative slope of this iso-welfare
function, d
ds
=   @W (s; ;)=@s
@W (s; ;)=@
, strictly atter at the tangent point (sc;  c) where sc =
cv
0(Q(sc;  c)). Thus, even when 
0
c is su¢ ciently close to c, the jump generates a strictly
positive marginal e¤ect on the global welfare for  2 [0; 0c].
For welfare comparison, we dene ()  WG(sA(); A(); ) WG(sO(); O(); ),
where the policy mixes are selected under the alternative and original policy sets, respec-
tively. We then have
E() =
Z 0c
0
()dF () +
Z c
0c
()dF ():
The di¤erentiation of E() with respect to 0c becomesZ 0c
0
@()
@0c
dF () +
Z c
0c
@()
@0c
dF () +  (
0
c) +(0c); (52)
where  (
0
c) (+(
0
c)) represents the limit from the LHS (RHS). Note that () > 0
for  < 0c and  (
0
c) > 0 whereas () < 0 for  2 (0c; c) and +(0c) < 0, and also
that (),  (
0
c) and +(
0
c) all approach zero if 
0
c ! c. We know from above that
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@()
@0c
< 0 for  2 [0; 0c] even when 0c is su¢ ciently close c. We next show that @()@0c ! 0
for  2 (0c; c) if 0c ! c. Suppose that a strictly decreasing function,  = (s), represents
the original iso-world-price function (51) on which the foreign welfare is constant. The
original policy mix (s; (s)) for  2 (0c; c) is then selected to maximize the home welfare
for  2 (0c; c),
@W (s; (s); )
@s
= [v0(Q(s; (s)))  s] Q
0D0
D0  Q0 = 0;
and thus satisfy s = v0(Q(s; (s))) given Q
0D0
D0 Q0 > 0. In comparison, the new policy mix
for  2 (0c; c) is the pooling point (sc;  c) that satises sc = cv0(Q(sc;  c)). This pooling
point (sc;  c) can be denoted by (sc; (sc)). Thus, for  2 (0c; c), the new pooling point,
while keeping the foreign welfare at the original level, cannot maximize the home welfare:
@W (sc; (sc); )
@sc
= [v0(Q(sc; (sc)))  sc] Q
0D0
D0  Q0 = [   c]v
0(Q(sc; (sc)))
Q0D0
D0  Q0 < 0:
Now, for  2 (0c; c), if 0c ! c, then along the original iso-world-price function (51), the
marginal home welfare at the original policy mix approaches the marginal home welfare
at the new pooling point (sc; (sc)) and hence, the marginal welfare loss associated with
a slight decrease in 0c from c,
@()
@0c
, diminishes to zero. In summary, we know from (52)
that a slight decrease in 0c from c raises E().
Step 1 (b): Suppose that an optimal agreement includes an iso-world-price function as
its policy subset and allows the use of Pigouvian subsidies on the function for  2 (1; 2].
Denote the original policy mix for  by (s(); ()) and the iso-world-price function for
 2 (1; 2] by
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s(2); (2)) for s 2 (s(1); s(2)]g: (53)
We begin by making two points from the original policy set. First, it is impossible to have
1 ! 0. If 1 ! 0 and so Pigouvian subsidies are used at the bottom for  2 (0; 2], then
we can follow the same procedure used above in (a) and improve the original policy set
by including a jump and entailing a new pooling at the endpoint (s(2); (2)) in (53).
Second, since it is impossible to use Pigouvian subsidies on an iso-world-price function at
the bottom, the original policy set that satises the monotonicity of the world price must
entail a pooling interval for  2 (c; 1) for some c < 1; 1 would otherwise approach
0. We now assume that the original policy set has a state-contingent (separating) subset
at the bottom for  2 [0; c] and consecutively has the iso-world-price function (53) for
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 2 (1; 2]. There is no loss of generality in this assumption for two reasons. First,
there exists a pooling interval for  2 (c; 1) in the original set regardless of whether (i)
(s(c); (c)) 6= (s(1); (1)) or (ii) (s(c); (c)) = (s(1); (1)). For (i), it has pooling
at (s(1); (1)) such that c is indi¤erent between (s(c); (c)) and (s(1); (1)), and
for (ii), it has pooling at the crossing point of two subsets, (s(c); (c)) = (s(1); (1)).
Note that c < 1 for both cases. Second, in Step 2 below, we justify the existence of the
state-contingent subset at the bottom and characterize it.
We now develop an alternative set that entails pooling at (s01; 
0
1) for  2 (c; 01],
Pigouvian subsidies for  2 (01; 02] along a new iso-world-price function
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(s02;  02) for s 2 (s01; s02]g; (54)
and pooling at the original endpoint in (53), (s(2); (2)), for  2 (02; 2]. For (i), the
policy mix (s01; 
0
1) is dened byW (s(c); (c); c) = W (s
0
1; 
0
1; c), and for (ii), it is dened
by a crossing point between the original subset for  2 [0; c] and the new subset (54).
Note that the alternative set approaches the original set if 02 ! 2. The di¤erentiation
of E() with respect to 02 becomesZ 01
c
@()
@02
dF () +
Z 02
01
@()
@02
dF () +
Z 2
02
@()
@02
dF () (55)
+[ (
0
1) +(01)]
d01
d02
+ [ (
0
2) +(02)]:
Note rst that a slight decrease in 02 from 2 causes the welfare gain for  2 (c; 01): if
02 ! 2, then @()@02 < 0 for  2 (c; 
0
1). This inequality is given by Case 3 in the proof of
Proposition 1: the new pooling point generates a higher global welfare since it involves a
higher world price while locating in the region f(s; ) : s > v0(Q(s; ))g. For the second
and third terms in (55), we can follow Step 1 and show that, if 02 ! 2, then @()@02 < 0 for
 2 (01; 02) and @()@02 ! 0 for  2 (
0
2; 2). The remaining terms approach zero if 
0
2 ! 2.
Hence, a slight decrease in 02 from 2 raises E().
Step 2: We show that an optimal agreement includes a state-contingent policy subset at
the bottom for  2 [0; c] for some c > 0. Assume that (i) the government with  2 [0; x]
pools at (s(0); (0)) where s(0) = 0 by Lemma 5, or (ii) only the lowest type 0 selects
(s(0); (0)), while types  2 (0; x] pool at a separate point (es;e). For (i), the iso-welfare
function for the type x, W (s;  ;x) = W (s(0); (0);x), is tangent to an iso-world-price
function at the point (bs;b) that satises bs = xv0(Q(bs;b)). The original policy set can
42
then be improved by including the iso-world-price function up to the point (bs;b),
f(s; ) : bpw(s; ) = bpw(bs;b) for s  bsg,
while preserving the original subset for s > bs. For (ii), we know from Lemma 8 that the
lowest type 0 is indi¤erent between (s(0); (0)) and (es;e). The original policy set can
thus immediately be improved by including the iso-world-price function up to the point
(es;e). 
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